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Abstract. The paper presents basic principles of network steganography, 
which is a comparatively new research subject in the area of information 
hiding, followed by a concise overview and classification of network 
steganographic methods and techniques. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As the production, storage and exchange of information becomes more extensive and 
important in the functioning of societies, the problem of protecting the information from 
unintended and undesired use becomes more complex. In modern societies, protection of 
information involves many interdependent policy and technological issues relating to 
information confidentiality, integrity, anonymity, authenticity, utility, etc. Classification of 
these issues is a problem in itself. Several such classifications have been proposed; among the 
most popular classifications are the CIA Triad (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) 
and the Parkerian Hexad [9]. In this paper, we do not discuss this type of conceptualisations; 
we focus on methods for providing confidentiality in the communication of digitised 
information. Our goal is to characterise a subset of such methods named network 
steganography which are information hiding techniques that utilise network protocols as 
enablers of hidden communication. The term network steganography was first coined in [12]. 
We begin our considerations with some general remarks concerning the terminology used in 
the area of information security, as we believe there is some confusion in this area. In 
particular, we aim to clarify the relationships between the terms steganography, cryptography 
and information hiding. 
The terms steganography and cryptography originate from the ancient Greek words 
steganos, meaning protected (covered), and kryptos, meaning hidden (secret), respectively. 
These two meanings are obviously quite close; if considered literally, the term steganography 
could be substituted with the term cryptography, and vice versa. It is also plausible to consider 
both steganography and cryptography to be different methods of hiding information: 
steganographic methods hide information, thereby making it “difficult to notice” (by means of 
embedding it in an information carrier), while cryptographic methods hide information by 
making it “difficult to recognize” (by means of transforming it). Note also that messages are 
bearers of information that is communicated (or stored); thus, the terms “information hiding” 
and “message hiding” (as well as the terms “communication” and “transmission”) should be 
formally distinguished. Herein, these distinctions are made only in the case of possible 
confusion. 
Such considerations of terminology, although potentially helpful in distinguishing different 
methods for providing information security, meet obstacles due to established conventions. In 
particular, in 1996, at the first Information Hiding Workshop held in Cambridge, UK, the 
meaning of the term information hiding and an associated classification of techniques were 
agreed upon [11]. This classification encompasses steganography, but not cryptography. 
Apart from steganography, “anonymity”, “copyright marking” and “covert channels” were 
distinguished. This seems a semantically inconsistent and misleading classification: (1) 
providing for anonymity of communicating parties can be achieved by means of hiding 
information that identifies the communicating parties, but also, e.g., by clever routing of data 
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transfer; (2) copyright marking, encompassing watermarking, does not always require hiding 
the mark, as in some applications, it is important to have the mark clearly visible (but hard to 
remove); (3) the distinction (as in [10], [15]) between steganography (and network 
steganography in particular) and “covert channels” (supposedly defined after Lampson [5] as 
communication paths that were neither designed nor intended for information transfer) is not 
well grounded. It is plausible to say that network steganography techniques create channels 
for hidden communication, but not that such channels exist a priori in a communication 
network. The capacity of the created channels depends on the steganography technique 
applied in the context of a particular communication network. 
Steganographic techniques may be classified with respect to different criteria, in particular 
with respect to their intended use and to the type of information carrier utilised. We constrain 
our considerations to techniques based on various functions of communication protocols of 
contemporary communication networks. This specific class of techniques is referred to as 
network steganography. Steganographic techniques for storing messages may be formally 
considered to be network steganography methods because the stored information may 
eventually be transmitted. While such techniques are quite extensively discussed in the 
literature, they are of marginal interest in the context of our considerations. 
Both cryptography and steganography techniques are practically applied in imperfect 
communication environments imposed by physical features of information carriers. While this 
imperfectness is generally an obstacle for cryptography, it is an essential enabling condition 
for many network steganography techniques that utilise redundant communication 
mechanisms (protocols) to cope with such imperfect environments to provide reliable 
communication. 
In principle, a message to be hidden with the use of a steganographic technique may be 
first encrypted with some cryptographic technique. Note, however, that if applied, this will 
potentially increase the probability that the message is noticed and thus reduces the chance of 
achieving the principal goal of the steganographic method in use. The main objectives and 
potential applications of information hiding with the use of steganographic and cryptographic 
methods should not be regarded as competitive and/or complementary alternatives. This is an 
important point in understanding the potential benefits and threats of using steganographic 
and cryptographic techniques. 
In contrast to cryptographic methods, the goal of steganography methods is to make the 
secret communication hard to notice, and this, in particular, is the reason for its alleged use by 
terrorists and by citizens of countries that prohibit the use of cryptographic methods in 
communication. Thus, research on steganography, and on network steganographic techniques 
in particular, provokes ethical questions concerning the risk that the research results will be 
used for malicious purposes. There is (should be) an ethical obligation for researchers who 
propose and publish new steganographic techniques to present methods for uncovering their 
use, i.e. steganalysis methods. As explained in the following, there is a trade-off between the 
effectiveness of any network steganographic technique (in terms of potential steganographic 
capacity) and its susceptibility to steganalysis (i.e., to being uncovered). Essentially, 
evaluating the effectiveness of a proposed technique requires evaluating its robustness to 
steganalysis. Thus, in an ethically proper presentation of a new technique, fulfilment of the 
ethical obligation comes naturally. 
 
 
2. Network steganography basics 
 
Generally speaking, when considering any communication network, three basic 
functionalities may be distinguished: services/applications, transport of information and 
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information flow control. In the traditional PSTN/ISDN, i.e., circuit-switched networks, the 
services/applications are basically provided by the network, transport takes place through 
transparent channels, and the control and transport functions are virtually separated. Once the 
end-to-end connection and transport channel are established, information (voice or data) is 
transported through the network without interference. The network user has little influence on 
the service delivered by the network and no influence on the flow of information. The 
Internet, i.e., a packet switched network, has substantially changed the traditional circuit-
switched network paradigm: services/applications are created by the network users rather than 
by the network itself, and the transport and control functions are not separated and can be 
influenced by the user. This change of paradigm was one of the main sources of the 
tremendous success of the Internet. However, these advances also introduced well-known 
problems with quality of service and with protecting the network and its users from 
harmful/undesired interference. It is thus not surprising that the Internet opened many new 
options for covert communication. This observation may be generalised to practically all 
types of contemporary fixed and mobile networks, and particularly to communication 
protocols, which are becoming increasingly diverse and complex, and thus susceptible to 
manipulation. Network steganography techniques take advantage of this susceptibility. 
Even elementary functions of communication protocols can be utilised to construct a 
steganographic method. Consider, for example, a query-response type of exchange of 
messages for which the communication protocol assumes that the response should come 
within a specific time limit; otherwise, it is treated as excessively delayed and discarded. 
Communicating parties that want to use this protocol for steganographic purposes may make 
an agreement, which becomes their shared secret, that the responses carrying hidden 
information will be purposefully excessively delayed and that such responses will be read by 
the recipient (i.e., not discarded). Therefore, the communication protocol is manipulated for 
steganographic purposes. This “trick” may be effective only if the communication channel 
introduces some delay in the message transmission. Potential observers of the communication 
– potential attackers – who know the communication protocol and follow it during 
observation, do not become suspicious of the existence of hidden communication if the 
frequency of occurrence of excessively delayed responses is not considered to be abnormal, 
i.e., does not exceed some expected frequency that the observers assume, based on their 
knowledge of delay properties of the communication network.  
This simple example represents some basic features of network steganography techniques. 
If generalised, the following features of network steganography techniques may be 
formulated: 
 
(C1) some functions of communication protocols are modified; 
 
(C2) the modification pertains to: 
  (C2a) functions of the protocols that are introduced to cope with the intrinsic 
imperfectness of communication channels (errors, delays, etc.) 
and/or to 
  (C2b) functions of the protocols that are introduced to define the type of information 
exchange (e.g. query-response, file transfer, etc.) and/or to adapt the form of 
messages (e.g. fragmentation, segmentation, etc.) to the information transmission 
carrier; 
 
(C3) the modifications are utilised by the communicating parties to make the observable 
effects of modifications difficult to discover (e.g., to seem to result from the imperfectness 
of the communication network and/or protocols).  
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Conditions C1, C2 and C3 constitute a proposed definition of network steganography 
techniques. 
 
Note that if condition C1 is not fulfilled, i.e., if there is no interference in the 
communication protocol, then some form of hidden communication still may be performed, 
namely if the secret shared by the sender and receiver is of the form: messages a, b, c, …, are 
interpreted as x, y, z …. Such hidden communication cannot be discovered by observing the 
exchange of messages, as these are interpreted on the semantic/pragmatic level by the sender 
and receiver. In effect, such hidden communication can be discovered only if the shared secret 
is disclosed. Obviously, this is not a very interesting case for research. 
Condition C2 refers to the fact that real world communication protocols must realise 
functions (C2a) that provide required quality-related performance of communication and 
functions (C2b) that govern the “logic” of communication and adapt the messages to the 
format of transmission carriers. If the communication functions are decomposed into 
functional layers, as for example in the OSI RM (Open Systems Interconnection Reference 
Model), then C2a functions are associated with lower layers and C2b functions with upper 
layers. In Fig. 1, these functions, in association with OSI RM protocol layers, are 
characterised in a general manner.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Protocol functions used for network steganography, associated with OSI RM layers  
   
The effectiveness of a particular technique depends on how successfully the C3 condition 
is fulfilled. Two essential measures of the effectiveness can be considered: the potential 
throughput of hidden messages – referred to as steganographic bandwidth – and the resistance 
to discovering the hidden communication, i.e., resistance to steganalysis. The two measures 
are interdependent: usually, the higher steganographic bandwidth, the lower the resistance to 
steganalysis. The latter is difficult to estimate quantitatively and depends not only on the 
sophistication of a steganographic technique but also on the knowledge and efficacy of 
potential observers of the communication. 
 
 
3. An overview of network steganography techniques 
 
As this is a short paper, the following overview does not cover all of the techniques 
proposed in the literature. The selection of techniques discussed herein is somewhat arbitrary; 
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nevertheless, the authors tried to select techniques that seem to be most representative in their 
class or that have introduced novel ideas and inspired new directions of research. 
Classification of network steganography methods may be based on protocol functions 
associated with the OSI RM layers (Fig. 2). In the physical and data link layers, 
steganographic techniques can exploit physical features of communication channels and/or 
imitate their imperfectness. For example, Szczypiorski and Mazurczyk [13] proposed a 
physical layer method called WiPad (Wireless Padding) intended for IEEE 802.11 OFDM 
networks. Its functioning is based on the insertion of hidden data into the padding of 
transmitted symbols. Szczypiorski [12] introduced a data link layer method called HICCUPS 
(Hidden Communication System for Corrupted Networks). The main idea of the method is to 
utilise transmission frames with intentionally wrong checksums. In a WLAN, all user 
terminals can “hear” data contained in frames transmitted in the medium; generally, frames 
with wrong checksums are discarded by terminals, whereas terminals that are aware of the use 
of the steganographic method can read such frames and extract hidden data from the frame 
payload field.   
Network steganography methods can also use the adjustment of the form of the messages 
to the type of network or means of transport. Kundur and Ahsan [4] proposed two such 
approaches for the OSI RM layer. In one solution, the bits of hidden data are inserted into 
unused or reserved parts of packet headers. This method works because many protocol 
standards do not mandate specific/standard values for the unused and reserved parts (these are 
not verified at the receiver). In particular, Kundur and Ahsan proposed steganographic use of 
the IP header’s DF (Don’t Fragment) flag. This approach is successful if the sender sends 
packets of size that are smaller than the path’s MTU (Maximum Transfer Unit). Many similar 
methods were also introduced for other fields of various protocols; e.g., Handel and Sandford 
[2] proposed using the unused bits of the IP header’s ToS (Type of Service) field and of the 
TCP header’s Flags field. In another solution, Kundur and Ahsan proposed utilising per 
packet sequence numbers of IP packets and their intentional re-sorting. 
For the OSI RM transport layer, Mazurczyk et al. [7] introduced the RSTEG 
(Retransmission Steganography) technique intended for a broad class of protocols with 
retransmission mechanisms. The main idea of RSTEG is to not acknowledge successfully 
received TCP segments to intentionally invoke retransmission. The retransmitted segment of 
user data carries hidden data in the payload field. 
Mazurczyk and Szczypiorski [8] suggested the utilisation of unused fields of the session 
layer protocol SIP (Session Initiation Protocol). For the presentation layer, Bender et al. [1] 
introduced various methods that embed hidden data into user data, e.g., by modifying the least 
significant bits of the digital signals – voice samples (audio) or pixels (images). Van 
Horenbeeck [14] proposed a steganographic method that inserts hidden data into the 
application layer HTTP’s headers and tags.  
Network steganography can use more than one protocol, in particular protocols from more 
than one OSI RM layer. Jankowski et al. [3] were the first to develop such a technique, called 
PadSteg (Padding Steganography). The term inter-protocol steganography has been proposed 
for this class of methods. PadSteg utilises the ARP, TCP, UDP or ICMP protocols, referred to 
as carrier-protocols, together with the Etherleak vulnerability (improper frame padding caused 
by ambiguities of the standardisation). To exchange steganograms, improper Ethernet frame 
padding is utilised in frames that use one of the carrier-protocols. While the secret 
communication occurs, hidden nodes can switch between carrier-protocols to minimise the 
risk of disclosure.  
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Fig. 2 Network steganography methods classification based on protocol functions associated 
with OSI RM layers 
 
Another possible classification of network steganography techniques may be based on the 
type of modification of Protocol Data Units (PDUs). Three types of modification may be 
considered: (1) modification of SDUs (Service Data Units), (2) modification of PCI (Protocol 
Control Information) and (3) modification of time-relations between PDUs. Case (1) includes 
modification of user data. Case (3) is realised, e.g., by reordering of packets and introducing 
purposeful delay of selected packets. Hybrid solutions involve a combination of the three 
cases. The classification is illustrated in Fig. 3. Hybrid solutions were introduced last; the first 
solutions were based on case (1), followed by solutions based on case (2). 
 
 
Fig. 3 Network steganography classification based on the type of PDUs modification 
 
In most older network steganography techniques, the place where the carrier is affected is 
inseparably tied to the location of the embedded steganogram. For example, in the method 
that is based on modification of the IP identification field [4], the modification of the carrier is 
tied to the location of the embedded steganogram. This tie also applies to techniques that are 
based on reordering of packets [4] and to techniques that modify digital media signals [1]. 
The tie-in was first alleviated in the HICCUPS technique [12], which resulted in increasing 
the technique’s resistance to steganalysis. 
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4. A final remark 
  
Due to the constantly increasing complexity of communication protocols, there is a 
growing need for network steganography. There is no doubt that new, more sophisticated 
techniques will be created and, in effect, the risk that they will be used for malicious purposes 
will increase. This concern adds new challenges to the difficult issue of providing network 
and information security. A deep understanding of the susceptibility of communication 
protocols to all types of manipulation (not only for steganographic purposes) becomes an 
extremely important issue. Research in the area of network steganography may be helpful in 
this respect. Research results should be used as guidelines for a methodology of designing a 
new generation of robust communication protocols. This is not only an engineering “must” 
but also an ethical obligation. 
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